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I. INTRODUCTION 
This article examines the problem in common law jurisdictions of judicial recusals for inappropriate, 
wrong or inadequate reasons. It will be argued that there are circumstances in which it would be wrong 
or inappropriate for an adjudicator to recuse himself or herself, that recusals are inappropriate when not 
objectively justified, or when employed for improper purposes, and that inappropriate recusals are 
potentially damaging to the justice system. It will thus be submitted that adjudicators need to adopt a 
robust approach in the application of the relevant recusal standards, and ought to resist the temptation to 
succumb to the pressure to recuse themselves if, viewed objectively, and apart from their own feelings, 
there is no valid ground for recusal.  
 
Andrew Smith J. warned in Dar Al Arkan v Majid Al-Sayed Bader Hashim Al Refai,
1
 that a judge “should 
decline to hear a case only for proper and sufficient reason to do so” and that “recusal is not an excuse 
for avoiding embarrassment”. A Commonwealth judge similarly warned against an adjudicator using a 
recusal as a “possibly convenient course of retiring from difficult litigation merely because one of the 
litigants asked him to do so.”
2
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Lesotho). 
2 
 
There is a tension in the common law on bias, between adjudicators’ responsibilities to withdraw when 
disqualified, and, to sit when not disqualified. For Rix L.J. in JSC BTA Bank v Ablyazov and others (No 
9)
 3
 (“Ablyazov”) this tension is “between the principles that justice must be seen to be done and that 
litigants must not be allowed to pick their own judges or disrupt proceedings unfairly”. Keane C.J. in 
Rooney v Minister for Agriculture
4
 saw it as a “dilemma” arising from the “need to ensure [that] the 
appearance, as well as the reality, of impartiality [is] reconciled with the proper functioning of the 
judicial system”.
5
 The tension inheres in the propositions that the application of the bias principles is 
“extremely”
6
, or highly
7
, or “wholly”
8
 fact-sensitive
9
 or fact-specific
10
, that judges have a “duty to sit”
11
, 
that “real” doubts must be resolved in favour of recusal,
12
 and that a judge “would be as wrong to yield to 
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a tenuous or frivolous objection as he would to ignore an objection of substance”.
13
  In Laird v Tatum,
14
 
Rehnquist J. spoke of “the equal duty concept”. Referring to federal cases dealing with disqualification, 
he noted that “[t]hose federal courts of appeals which have considered the matter have unanimously 
concluded that a federal judge has a duty to sit where not disqualified which is equally as strong as the 
duty to not sit where disqualified”.
15
 Notwithstanding a 1974 amendment to 28 US Code s.455, aimed at 
tempering the impact of the duty to sit (and which some federal courts have treated with caution
16
), US 
federal courts continue to affirm this duty.
17
 Stempel
18
 is scathing in his criticisms of Rehnquist J. in 
Laird v Tatum, of the “pernicious” form of the duty to sit doctrine, and of the courts that continue to 
apply it despite the 1974 legislation, but accepts that “[t]o the extent one views the duty to sit as a general 
and rebuttable obligation to preside over a case unless disqualified, it is unobjectionable”. This accords 
with what Stempel calls the “benign” version of the duty to sit,
19
 and with the statement in Locabail that 
real doubts should be resolved in favour of recusal. It is the sense in which the “duty to sit” is employed 
in this article. The difficulty lies in how adjudicators should strike the correct balance between the duty 
to sit (or the “duty not to recuse”
20
) and the duty to recuse themselves.  
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The “rule against bias” is instrumental, and also an end.
21
 Apparently, applying it strictly reduces the risk 
of erroneous decisions.
22
 Nevertheless, a strict test is recognised as costly, indirectly impacting on public 
confidence in the administration of justice.
23
 While commentators have rightly expressed concern about 
wrongful denials of recusal motions, similar concern about wrongful recusals is warranted. Despite a 
paucity of compelling empirical evidence, it seems accepted that wrongful failures to recuse are 
damaging to the justice system. But if an inappropriate non-recusal would taint the justice system in the 
eyes of parties or the general public,
24
 so could inappropriate recusals, which, in addition to the 
additional costs and burdens that they inflict on the parties, can beget unintended consequences. In 
particular, they might encourage abuse and manipulation of the justice system, parties might ultimately 
succeed in judge-shopping, and the proper functioning of the justice system might be at risk of being 
undermined. There is another dimension. Inappropriate recusals have been described as being “an 
encouragement of procedural abuse”,
25
 “an abdication of judicial function”,
26
 “irresponsible”,
27
 and 
“being untruthful to one’s oath to do right by all manner of persons”.
28
 Thus, the problem of 
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inappropriate recusals is not simply a matter of concern about potential mischiefs. It goes to the heart of 
whether judicial officers are failing to perform their duty.  
 
II. THE ISSUES 
 
The right to a fair hearing requires, among other things, that an adjudicator compromised by interest or 
favour must withdraw from the case. The disqualification extends beyond actual bias, to perceived,
29
 
apparent,
30
 or objective
31
 bias, and the standard in such cases is “purely”
32
 or “strictly”
33
 objective. 
Although parties are entitled to object to their case being heard by a biased or otherwise relevantly 
compromised judge, they are not entitled to choose their own judges. Judges enjoy a presumption of 
impartiality in the performance of their judicial functions.
34
 This presumption is rebuttable - but not 
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easily so.
35
 Displacing it requires “cogent evidence”
36
, since it “carries considerable weight”.
37
 
Adjudicators must recuse themselves in appropriate cases, either mero motu or in response to a recusal 
application, must resolve real doubts in favour of recusal, and must sit when not disqualified. Therein lies 
the tension.  
 
Academic comment on inappropriate recusals is scant,
38
 yet it is a phenomenon that raises a new set of 
issues; but why should it be of concern? One answer is because the duty of fairness and the right to a fair 
trial apply to all parties in legal proceedings,
39
 who may have expended significant resources in a trial 
that then has to be started de novo if the judge is discharged. Therefore, a party may have very strong 
financial reasons for not wanting the case to stop, especially in a long-running trial. The risk of depleted 
financial resources is real. This may even threaten the ability of parties to continue the case, hence a real 
danger of injustice being perpetrated. Also real is the risk of injustice due to undue delay.
40
 Additionally, 
where the bias point is only taken after substantive rulings in the case, an inappropriate recusal may 
require the victorious party to re-litigate issues that had already been won in a fair fight. These factors 
may bring the justice system into disrepute. A second answer lies in the need to preserve judicial 
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independence. Inappropriate recusals may encourage “fishing expeditions” that harass judges, to the 
detriment of judicial independence and the administration of justice. Sir Stephen Sedley has noted that 
“independence and impartiality are the twin pillars without which justice cannot stand, and the purpose 
of recusal is to underpin them”.
41
 He also noted that recusal law provides “a field of opportunity for 
manipulation”.
42
 It remains therefore crucial that independence is not sacrificed at the altar of 
impartiality, and that application of the bias standards does not impinge on either pillar.  
 
Mason J captured the issues and tensions when he said in Re JRL; Ex parte CJL
43
:  
 
“Although it is important that justice must be seen to be done, it is equally important that judicial 
officers discharge their duty to sit and do not, by acceding too readily to suggestions of 
appearance of bias, encourage parties to believe that by seeking the disqualification of a judge, 
they will have their case tried by someone thought to be more likely to decide the case in their 
favour.”
44
 
 
 
III. SHOULD AN APPELLATE/REVIEW COURT INTERVENE? 
 
Before examining the emergent case law, I will address briefly the issue of the correct response to an 
inappropriate recusal. While few would object to the notion that an adjudicator’s denial of a recusal 
application should be appealable, it might seem odd for an appellate court to intervene in a decision of a 
                                                          
41
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judicial tribunal to recuse itself
45
 - after all, the tribunal is arguably best placed to know when it might 
struggle to demonstrate its impartiality. But should different considerations apply to a decision to 
withdraw, vis-à-vis a decision to continue to sit?  
 
It has been said that a judicial officer who continues to sit when recusal is required commits an 
“irregularity” throughout the rest of the proceedings.
46
 However, it seems that the contrary is not 
necessarily true.
47
 In S v Motlhabane
48
 the court accepted the view that, even if the review court does not 
share the trial judge’s view that recusal was in the circumstances necessary, “it should be very slow 
indeed to hold that such recusation constitutes an irregularity”.
49
 In its view, since the bona fides of the 
presiding officer had not been questioned by any party, the conclusion was that, as the presiding officer 
had already recused himself, “he [was] now functus officio”, and the matter should start de novo and 
proceed before another presiding officer. In Begraj v Heer Manak Solicitors
50
 Langstaff J. dismissed an 
appeal against a decision of an Employment Tribunal to recuse itself. He noted
51
 that the parties were 
aware of only one case (WestLB AG London Branch v Pan, discussed below) in which an appellate court 
had overturned a decision by a tribunal to recuse itself, and, that this was not surprising, given then 
observation in Locabail that doubts should be resolved in favour of recusal. He was however of the view 
                                                          
45
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51
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that the authorities “are clear that an appeal court is generally in as good a position as a tribunal to assess 
what the fair-minded and informed observer would think.”
52
 He did not see “why this principle should 
apply differentially depending on whether that tribunal decided to refuse an application to it to recuse 
itself, or to accede to it.” He nonetheless felt that there would be a difference in the “information” which 
the informed observer would have. Such an observer:  
 
“would know in the latter case that the tribunal itself took the view that there might be a risk of 
bias … It also conveys the tribunal’s own concern that it may not fully be able to keep the 
matters out of the minds of its members. Finally, but importantly, where the parties are told by a 
tribunal that it accepts it may not be able to appear to give the case the icy impartiality which is a 
prerequisite of justice, for them then to be told that despite that tribunal’s own view of its 
limitations they should none the less face a hearing before it is to risk public disrespect for the 
system that requires this.”
53
 
 
So, on one view of the matter, a decision by a tribunal to recuse itself constitutes “evidence” that there 
might be a risk of bias. While reasonable, this proposition must be qualified, for there must be a sound 
objective basis for the tribunal’s decision, otherwise there is no “evidence” at all. While a recusal on 
proper grounds is rightly the end of the matter,
54
 an inappropriate recusal is not necessarily the end of the 
matter,
55
 nor should it be, as that would just convert a wrong decision into a fait accompli.  
 
                                                          
52
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(N), at 419; S v Skhosana [2014] ZAGPJHC 223, at [13]-[14] (South Gauteng High Court, SA). 
55
 See eg, Banda C.J. in Attorney General v Chipeta [1996] 1 L.R.C. 459, at 462 – “Having wrongly 
recused himself in the first instance we find that he was not functus officio and was entitled to resume 
hearing the case” (CA, Malawi). 
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The discussion that follows, wherein the various categories of inappropriate recusal which I have 
identified are examined, will hopefully demonstrate that the threat of inappropriate recusals is not 
academic.  
 
IV. CATEGORIES OF INAPPROPRIATE RECUSAL 
 
1. Appeasement 
 
The case law demonstrates that appeasement is not an appropriate ground for recusal. In Arab Monetary 
Fund v Hashim and Others (No 8), Sir Thomas Bingham M.R. noted that:  
 
“Dr Hashim had applied to the then Vice-Chancellor, Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson, for the 
judge to be discharged from further conduct of the case. The Vice-Chancellor had concluded that 
no grounds were shown for a change of judge but as an indulgence to Dr Hashim he directed that 
a different judge [Chadwick J.] be appointed to conduct the trial”.
56
  
 
As it transpired, the litigant subsequently went on to apply for the recusal of Chadwick J. himself – an 
application which the Court of Appeal felt should never have been brought – and which demonstrates the 
futility of appeasements. 
 
A recusal decision based on appeasement (described as a “reasonable adjustment”) was rightly 
overturned in WestLB AG London Branch v Pan.
57
 The judge considered that the requirements for 
recusal had not been satisfied, but decided to recuse herself anyway, in order to save costs on both sides, 
enable to parties to concentrate on the substantive issues in the run up to the hearing, and to ensure “that 
any upset that this issue is causing to the Claimant, who is unwell, does not continue.” On appeal to the 
EAT, HHJ Richardson said that it was “plain that the Employment Judge did not decide the application 
                                                          
56
 (1993) Times, 4 May. 
57
 2011 WL 2747817, UKEAT/0308/11/DM (EAT, 19 July 2011). 
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to recuse herself upon correct principles”.
58
 Among other things, she did not give sufficient weight to the 
authorities, and seemed to have decided to order a fresh panel almost on medical grounds.
59
 It was clear 
that her decision to recuse herself on grounds of bias “was without foundation”, and her decision to order 
a fresh panel was set aside.
60
  
 
The recent Court of Appeal decision in Otkritie
61
 is also in point. Eder J. faced an application
62
 to recuse 
himself on grounds of alleged pre-judgment and “actual bias”. He rejected the arguments based on 
prejudgment,
63
 but felt that the claim of actual bias was “more problematic”.
64
 He thought that the 
specific points relied on were “entirely groundless”, and that to recuse himself in the face of such 
“spurious allegations” would arguably be similar granting an “indulgence”. He however felt that, 
regardless of his own views, the allegations were “so serious that the appropriate course is that I should 
recuse myself”.
65
 He reached this conclusion “with extreme reluctance”, but felt that this was the more 
appropriate course of action.
66
 He thought that the decision was consistent with the principle in Locabail 
that doubts must be resolved in favour of recusal. On appeal to the Court of Appeal
67
, Longmore L.J. said 
that the mere elevation of the allegation from imputed bias to actual bias did not make a critical 
difference.
68
 With respect to Eder J.’s reliance on the statement in Locabail about how to resolve doubts, 
                                                          
58
 At [28]. 
59
 At [32]. 
60
 At [33]-[34]. 
61
 Above, fn.6. 
62
 [2014] EWHC 1323 (Comm). 
63
 At [15]-[16]. 
64
 At [17]. 
65
 Ibid. 
66
 At [18]. 
67
 [2014] EWCA Civ 1315. 
68
 At [23]. 
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Longmore L.J. said
69
 that Eder J. did not explain what “the real ground for doubt” was in this case. 
Rather, the judge “specifically said” that the allegations of bias were “groundless” and “spurious”.  
 
Longmore L.J. noted
70
 that Eder J. appeared not to have been referred to the remarks of Chadwick L.J. in 
Triodos Bank NV v Dobbs
71
 (“Dobbs”), where Chadwick L.J. said:  
 
“It is always tempting for a judge against whom criticisms are made to say that he would prefer 
not to hear further proceedings in which the critic is involved. It is tempting to take that course 
because the judge will know that the critic is likely to go away with a sense of grievance if the 
decision goes against him. Rightly or wrongly, a litigant who does not have confidence in the 
judge who hears his case will feel that, if he loses, he has in some way been discriminated 
against. But it is important for a judge to resist the temptation to recuse himself simply because it 
would be more comfortable to do so.”
72 
 
Longmore L.J. felt that, had Eder J. been referred to these remarks, he might very well have decided that 
he ought not to recuse himself.
73
 According to him, while the Court of Appeal will usually be astute to 
support judges who are exercising “this delicate jurisdiction” of recusal, it is important that judges “do 
not recuse themselves too readily in long and complex cases otherwise the convenience of having a 
single judge in charge of both the procedural and substantial parts of the case will be seriously 
undermined”.
74
 The recusal decision was overturned and the matter was remitted to Eder J. 
 
 
                                                          
69
 At [25]. 
70
 [2014] EWCA Civ 1315, [27]. 
71
 [2005] EWCA Civ 468. 
72
 At [8]. 
73
 [2014] EWCA Civ 1315, [27]. 
74
 At [32]. 
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2. Mere allegations 
 
In Ansar v Lloyds TSB Bank Plc
75
 the Court of Appeal emphasised that “a mere complaint cannot give 
rise to an automatic decision to recuse”.
76
 An applicant’s argument that his case is “unassailable” is 
likewise insufficient,
77
 and, as Denham J. said in Talbot v McCann Fitzgerald Solicitors, the applicant’s 
“belief in the strength of his case does not establish any bias by the Court”.
78
 In the Dobbs case (above) 
the Court of Appeal rejected the proposition that the mere fact that someone is criticising judges renders 
the judges bound to recuse themselves for bias. Chadwick L.J. explained:  
 
“The reason is this. If judges were to recuse themselves whenever a litigant … criticised them … 
we would soon reach the position in which litigants were able to select judges to hear their cases 
simply by criticising all the judges that they did not want to hear their cases.”
79
  
 
The mere fact that a party claims to have “no confidence in the fairness” of the court is similarly 
insufficient. In Automobile Proprietary Ltd. v Healy,
80
 an industrial tribunal had purported to order a 
rehearing before a different tribunal after more than one day of the hearing of a case of unfair dismissal. 
Despite rejecting allegations of bias, it said that, if the employee had “no confidence in the fairness of the 
hearing he is getting we cannot proceed and the case will need to be heard by another tribunal”. On 
                                                          
75
 [2006] EWCA Civ 1462. 
76
 Waller L.J. at [20]. See also Underhill J. in The Queen on the Application of Mayo-Denman v 
Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2007] EWHC 3529 (Admin) – upheld on 
appeal ([2010] EWCA Civ 473, at [9]-[10], Sullivan L.J.); Cooch R.J. in State of Delaware v Desmond, 
above, fn.27; Guni J. in Sole v Cullinan [2003] LSHC 19, 19 (HC, Lesotho). 
77
 See Denham J. in Talbot v Hermitage Golf Club [2009] IESC 26, at [9], [16]-[19] (SC, Ireland). 
78
 [2009] IESC 25, at [37] (SC, Ireland). 
79
 Above, fn.71, at [8]. 
80
 [1979] I.C.R. 809. 
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appeal to the EAT, Talbot J. noted
81
 that the tribunal had stated that they were unable to see any ground 
upon which the application could be made. That being so, he found it “difficult to see how they could 
correctly in law have sought to exercise a discretion and grant the application”. The employee’s stated 
lack of confidence was, by itself, “no ground which would entitle an industrial tribunal to discontinue the 
hearing and to order a rehearing”.
82
 The appeal was allowed, and the matter was remitted to the industrial 
tribunal to continue the hearing. 
 
3. Personal attacks (and broad backs) 
 
One issue emerging from the case law concerns personal attacks against adjudicators, and the 
“broadness” of the adjudicators’ “backs”. Strongly-worded personal attacks against adjudicators do not 
by themselves constitute appropriate grounds for recusal. Neither do threats, designed ‘to force recusal 
and manipulate the judicial system’, rather than arising from actual malice.
 83
 Otherwise, a defendant 
could: 
“readily manipulate the system, threatening every jurist assigned on the ‘wheel’ until the 
defendant gets a judge he preferred. Also, the defendant could force delays, perhaps making the 
cases against him more difficult to try, perhaps putting witnesses at greater risk. Such blatant 
manipulation would subvert our processes, undermine our notions of fair play and justice, and 
damage the public’s perception of the judiciary.”
84
  
 
This buttresses the need for a robust application of the standards. The Supreme Court of Papua New 
Guinea similarly confirmed in Yama v Bank South Pacific
85
 that it “is not the law that a Judge should 
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disqualify himself just because a litigant has been or continues to be adversely critical of him even to the 
point of being defamatory and contemptuous.”  
 
In Aziz v Crown Prosecution Service
86
 an Employment Tribunal (“ET”) recused itself despite rejecting as 
unfounded the allegations of actual or apparent bias. The members decided to recuse themselves because 
the prior conduct of the respondent, which had become an issue by being raised by Ms Aziz, had put 
them in an “impossible situation”. In their view, the issue could not now be disregarded, especially 
seeing that the respondent proposed to resist that part of the complaint.
87
 On appeal to the EAT, Slade J. 
pointed out that the ET did not outline the legal basis for recusing themselves other than describing it as a 
“conflict of interest”
88
. In her view, even if counsel had challenged the integrity of the judge as alleged, 
“without more, that challenge, even if felt to be personally offensive, would not justify the EJ or the ET 
recusing themselves”.
89
 In the event, the conclusion was that “the basis on which the ET recused 
themselves was not well founded in law and on the material before them was one which no reasonable 
ET properly directing themselves could have reached”.
90
 While personal attacks on judges do occur, 
courts and tribunals do need to have “broad backs”
91
. The recusal decision was set aside, and the case 
“remitted for determination by the same Employment Tribunal”.
92
 
 
                                                          
86
 2013 WL 6148258, UKEAT/0027/13/LA (EAT, 21 November 2013). 
87
 At [14] of the ET’s decision, as reproduced in the judgment of Slade J. in the EAT, at [34]. 
88
 At [57]. 
89
 At [67]. 
90
 At [74]. 
91
 At [86]. 
92
 At [89]. 
16 
 
On the issue of “broad backs”, Stempel rightly said in a slightly different context, that “[a] judge who is 
unduly sensitive to criticism needs to find another line of work”.
93
 In Osonnaya v Queen Mary - 
University of London
94
, the EAT said that the tribunal “must be robust in the face of applications for 
recusal”.
95
 A recent decision of the Constitutional Court of South Africa indicates the kinds of issue at 
stake. Turnbull-Jackson v Hibiscus Court Municipality
96
 involved an allegation of bias against an 
administrator, whose duties were subject to the same principles of bias as the ones under discussion.
97
 
Counsel for the applicant coined the term “reactive bias” for the argument that he was to put before the 
Court, which the Court as “rather peculiar”. According to the Madlanga J: 
 
“It is articulated thus. Throughout [the administrator’s] involvement in the approval process, the 
applicant has levelled insults at him that were calculated to impugn his integrity. He accused him 
of bias, corruption and incompetence.  From this, the applicant sought to convince this Court that 
the natural human reaction to repeated insults of this nature is to be biased against the person 
hurling them. And, because the applicant insulted [the administrator] beyond some threshold, the 
exact location of which I have no idea, it is reasonable to believe that [the administrator] was not 
impartial. The conclusion is that [the administrator] ought to have recused himself as the 
decision-maker.”
98
 
 
                                                          
93
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Unsurprisingly, the Court rejected the argument. According to Madlanga J., this “would be the easiest 
stratagem for the unscrupulous to get rid of unwanted decision-makers: if I insult you enough – whatever 
enough may be – you are out.”
99
   
 
In Siemer v Heron
100
 the Supreme Court of New Zealand likewise highlighted a major concern about 
inappropriate recusals. McGrath J. noted that the informed observer “will, amongst other considerations, 
recognise that the public is entitled to be reassured that parties to litigation are not able unilaterally to 
create situations of apparent bias that enable them to require change to the composition of courts hearing 
their cases, or to have cases reheard following an unfavourable decision”.
101
 In this context, it is also 
useful to recall the words of Douglas J. in Mayberry v Pennsylvania
102
 that “brazen efforts to denounce, 
insult, and slander the court and to paralyze the trial are at war with the concept of justice under law”, 
and that “A judge cannot be driven out of a case”.
103
 
 
Of particular concern is Bennett v Southwark London Borough Council.
104
 An employee’s lay 
representative in a lengthy case involving allegations of racial discrimination against the employer, had 
said to the ET in response to their denial of his requests for an adjournment: “If I were a white barrister I 
would not be treated in this way” and “If I were an Oxford-educated white barrister with a plummy voice 
I would not be put in this position” (these comments were subsequently labelled by Ward L.J. in the 
Court of Appeal as “inexcusable petulance”
105
). The ET thereupon took the view that that it could not 
continue to hear a case on race discrimination in which it had itself now been accused of racism, and 
recused itself. The case was heard by another tribunal, which struck out the case. On appeal, the EAT 
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held
106
 that the ET was wrong to recuse itself. The Court of Appeal reversed the EAT on other grounds, 
but agreed with this decision on the recusal. Counsel for the employer (on a cross-appeal) argued before 
the Court of Appeal that the ET had been right to recuse itself, because once a tribunal forms the view 
that it cannot continue to handle a case with impartiality, nothing the parties say can enable it to resume 
with an impartial mind. Sedley L.J. said that this argument “assumes that the tribunal has reached the 
point at which it can properly form such a view”.
107
 This statement, in emphasising the need for proper 
grounds for a recusal, is significant. Sedley L.J. continued: 
 
“Courts and tribunals do need to have broad backs, especially in a time when some litigants and 
their representatives are well aware that to provoke actual or ostensible bias against themselves 
can achieve what an application for adjournment cannot. Courts and tribunals must be careful to 
resist such manipulation, not only where it is plainly intentional but equally where the effect of 
what is said to them, however blind the speaker is to its consequences, will be indistinguishable 
from the effect of manipulation.”
108
 
 
Ward L.J. said that the judicial duty must be “performed both without fear as well as without favour”, 
and that the ET did not “act fearlessly when it capitulated to the inexcusable petulance and insolence” 
displayed by the lay representative.
109
 According to him, the ET was wrong not to listen to the diatribe 
“with phlegmatic fortitude, retiring, if necessary, to compose itself and to cool the advocate’s ardour, and 
then calmly continuing”. On the deleterious effects of the inappropriate recusal, the following comments 
of Ward L.J. are poignant:  
 
“This case fills me with despair. First there is the inexcusable petulance displayed by … the 
applicant’s legally untrained advocate. Secondly there is the unfortunate capitulation by the … 
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tribunal to his insolence. Thirdly there is the five-year delay between the … decision and this 
judgment. Finally there is the horrific prospect of rehearing events some already over a decade 
old.”
110
 
 
This is requires no elaboration, but demonstrates the need for a robust approach. 
 
4. Intellectual difficulty 
 
Intellectual difficulty is an inappropriate ground for recusal. In re B (Children) (FC)
111
 is in point. A 
judge had recused himself mero motu, on the basis that he had instigated a particular test in relation to 
the existing law, and that others might perceive that he would find it difficult to put his view of the law 
out of his mind. Baroness Hale in her leading speech responded thus: 
 
“[A]ll judges are from time to time required to apply legal principles with which they have 
intellectual difficulty. The problem which the judge saw in this case will arise in any other care 
case in which allegations are made but not found on the balance of probabilities to be true. If the 
judge is not fitted to try this case, it might be said that he is not fit to try any case in which the 
same problem could arise, and that would be absurd. For all the reasons given earlier, the same 
judge should hear the whole case”.
112
  
 
Baroness Hale pointed out
113
 that this case was “a good illustration” (presumably of a situation wherein a 
recusal would be inappropriate or of the potential damaging impact of inappropriate recusals) because 
any subsequent judge might well have difficulty in extracting the really important findings from such a 
long and complicated judgment on the factual issues. 
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5. Pragmatism 
 
In AWG Group Ltd v Morrison
114
 Mummery L.J. said, in respect of cases where the hearing had not yet 
begun, that there was “scope for the sensible application of the precautionary principle”, if the court had 
to “predict what might happen if the hearing went ahead before the judge to whom objection is taken and 
to assess the real possibility of apparent bias arising”. In such cases, “prudence naturally leans on the side 
of being safe rather than sorry”. While these statements may appear to promote a pragmatic approach, the 
better view is that they simply reflect the proposition that real doubts should be resolved in favour of 
recusal. Clearly, the courts do not advocate a blanket pragmatic approach. In Balamoody v Nursing and 
Midwifery Council
115
, Burton J. summarised the decision of Court of Appeal in Ansar
116
 as being that 
“recusal by an employment judge or chairman or any judge or tribunal should be the exception, and 
should only arise where there was, or was perceived to be, a real risk of bias, and that pragmatic 
withdrawal or standing down was consequently not advisable”.
117
 In Balamoody an employment judge 
had transferred a pre-hearing review to another judge, as a matter of convenience, but upon objections 
raised by one of the parties. This seemed to have been considered as a recusal by both judges. Burton J.’s 
view of what the employment judge had done was that he “simply took the de facto step of finding 
someone else to take over, in order to avoid any argument”.
118
 In short, he had “simply pulled out on 
pragmatic grounds”.
119
 The question was whether, having thus “recused” himself from the earlier 
proceedings, he ought to have recused himself from further proceedings in the case. Answering in the 
negative, Burton J. said
120
, inter alia, that the EAT was “entirely satisfied” that “there was no 
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conceivable basis” for the earlier recusal by the EJ. Highlighting some of the possible consequences of 
inappropriate recusals, Burton J. referred to a fax sent to the ET by counsel for the applicant, wherein he 
listed six Chairmen “who had heard any application concerning his client, in front of whom he said any 
hearing should not be listed.” This emphasised “the need for there not to be the kind of pragmatic 
standing down which occurred in this case, with all good intentions”,
121
 and illustrates the type of 
unintended consequences referred to earlier.  
 
6. Avoiding a conundrum unrelated to bias 
 
A subset of the general pragmatic approach concerns recusals aimed at circumventing problems 
unrelated to bias. The recent decision of a South African High Court is illustrative. In Lelaka v S
122
 a man 
had hit another man on the head with a bottle, causing the victim to be hospitalised. The assailant 
pleaded guilty to a charge of assault with intention to do grievous bodily harm in the magistrates’ court, 
and was found guilty on his plea. Pending the sentencing hearing, the victim died in hospital from his 
injuries, the post-mortem report identifying the cause of death as “severe blunt force head trauma”. The 
prosecution thereupon informed the court of its intention to refer the case to the DPP for further 
instructions. The lawyer for the accused argued that, as the accused was already convicted, he was 
entitled to be sentenced and have the matter finalised. The magistrate was in a quandary. There was no 
provision in the Criminal Procedure Act that covered the factual situation of this case, but if she followed 
the law as it stood, she would be compelled to sentence the accused for an assault with intention to do 
grievous bodily harm, when the facts pointed to a murder having been committed. So she recused herself 
from the case, “to enable the case to be taken on review with the hope that the review court may decide 
that the matter be commenced de novo”. On review before the High Court, Matlapeng A.J., delivering 
the unanimous judgment of the court, had “no doubt that to proceed to sentence the accused on a lesser 
charge when there is evidence that the deceased died of the injuries inflicted by the accused, would be a 
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serious travesty of justice”
123
, and therefore set aside the criminal proceedings before the magistrates 
court. However, he was unhappy about the decision of the magistrate to recuse herself, saying: 
 
“I feel constrained to comment on the conduct displayed by the learned magistrate.  Whilst she 
displayed a good understanding of the law, recusing herself mero motu with the sole intention to 
have the matter sent on review, is to be discouraged. Once a presiding officer is seized with a 
matter, he or she is legally obliged to finalise it unless there are good grounds not to do so.
”124
 
 
This was a difficult situation for the judge; but recusal was an inappropriate response. Rather, the matter 
should have been referred to the High Court for special review.
125
 
 
 
V. ANALYSIS 
 
In this discussion I have sought to demonstrate that there is such a thing as an “inappropriate recusal”. I 
have also sought to spotlight the problematic nature of inappropriate recusals and the difficulties that 
they can beget. The cases discussed herein have provided insights on considerations that should not lead 
to a recusal. It is easy to be wiser with the benefit of hindsight - but these judges were confronted with 
the tension described at the beginning of this article. Adopting a “better safe than sorry” approach in such 
circumstances is understandable. Nevertheless, the problem of inappropriate recusals is not primarily a 
concern about wilful judicial abdications of responsibility. An inappropriate recusal is no less so because 
the adjudicator was mistaken, rather than wilfully shirking his or her duty, and the consequences for the 
parties remain the same. A mistaken failure to withdraw renders the ensuing judgment liable to be set 
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aside on appeal, and a rehearing/re-trial to be ordered.
126
 Likewise, a mistaken decision to withdraw can, 
as has been seen, have a similar outcome.
127
 In the cases discussed, the errors of the inappropriately 
recusing judges were corrected on appeal; but those were cases wherein there was an appeal.  On one 
view, it could be said that, on a successful appeal, the system has corrected itself, no damage has been 
done, and “what is the problem?” However, a discussion on inappropriate non-recusals would also reveal 
wrongful failures to recuse being corrected on appeal. So, again, the system would have corrected itself, 
no damage has been done, and “what is the problem?” Clearly, the latter scenario would, if the case is 
assigned to another judge for rehearing, involve significant additional costs, delay, etc. On the other 
hand, if on a finding of an inappropriate recusal the case is remitted to the recusing judge/court to 
continue the hearing, these costs and delays would largely be avoided. But this matter is not so 
straightforward.  
 
The prospect of a case being remitted to a court that had initially recused itself raises difficulties. The 
view of Langstaff J. in Begraj v Heer Manak Solicitors that a decision by a tribunal to recuse itself 
indicates that there might be a risk of bias has already been discussed above.
128
 If it is not a compelling 
reason against the intervention of a higher court, then it is probably not a convincing rationale against 
remittal to the recusing judge. However, the parties and the “informed observer” would know that the 
judge had (even if wrongly) considered that there was a risk of bias. How would this impact the 
confidence of the parties (or the public) if the judge then continues with the hearing? Langstaff J. rightly 
noted in Begraj that this would “risk public disrespect for the system”. While exoneration by a 
review/appellate court may cast the judge in a positive light, there may well be niggling suspicions about 
a judge who has had to be reassured that he or she can be impartial. And, if the judge got that decision 
wrong, what else could he or she get wrong? Was the judge truly conflicted, or just trying to escape a 
hard case? Neither would promote confidence. Additionally, if the recusal decision was taken in response 
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to an application by one of the parties, that party may be concerned that, having (wrongly) challenged a 
judge who was then moved to take a decision that has now been overturned, he or she may have incurred 
that judge’s disfavour.
129
 Similarly, it has rightly been noted that “[t]he lawyer considering whether to 
raise the recusal issue risks the judge’s retribution if the motion is unsuccessful”.
130
 Thus, while 
vindictiveness is not an attribute of judicial office, it may still be problematic to return to the same judge.  
 
Remittal to the recusing judge may be considered a natural consequence of a decision that recusal was 
inappropriate; but there is no consensus on this matter, as has been seen above. If the view is taken that a 
recusing judge has eo ipso become functus officio even if the recusal is erroneous
131
, and/or that an 
appellate/review court should not intervene
132
, then there would be no prospect of remittal, producing 
identical outcomes for inappropriate recusals and inappropriate non-recusals (rehearing before a different 
judge/court). In both instances, the parties would face re-litigating the same issues, and would be 
subjected to similar additional costs and delay; the parties may struggle to finance the extended, 
protracted litigation, and important evidence may be irretrievably lost or suffer reduced credibility. 
Injustice may be perpetrated. The parties would end up frustrated and aggrieved, and the image of justice 
would suffer. As one commentator has noted, “slow administration of justice will undermine the 
confidence society has in the peaceful settlement of disputes”, and also admits of other evils.
133
 In short, 
the impact of an inappropriate recusal on the parties, the public, and their perceptions of the justice 
system, may be not much different in cases of non-remittal to an inappropriately recusing judge from the 
impact of an inappropriate non-recusal. This would be particularly so when the recusal takes place after 
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substantive rulings have been handed down in the case, or after the case has been part-heard. 
Inappropriate recusals at early stages may not raise some of these concerns, but would carry the risks of 
unwittingly encouraging “fishing expeditions” or judge-shopping, and their potential negative 
implications for judicial independence and the administration of justice. 
 
This inquiry has been assisted by the fortune of having appellate courts reject inappropriate recusals. 
However, such opportunities only arise when someone chooses to challenge the recusal. Not all recusals 
are challenged, and it would be unusual if they were all appropriate;
134
 hence there may be any number of 
hidden inappropriate recusals where the parties have simply cut their losses.
135
 It is not satisfactory to say 
that, since they have not actually been adjudged inappropriate, they do not matter, for their being 
“hidden” in one sense still leaves their harmful impacts unchecked, and arguably more insidious. 
Furthermore there are cases where no appeal is possible (eg, decisions of judges of final courts, or 
jurisdictions that do not permit recusals to be challenged), wherein the reasons for a recusal are 
unknown.
136
 For example, the recusal practices of the US Supreme Court have been thus described: 
 
“When a litigant files a motion to recuse, the Justice’s decision is memorialized as a one page, 
typically one-sentence, unpublished order directed to the parties. When a Justice recuses sua 
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sponte, a short statement appears in the case report that the Justice took no part in the decision 
being reported.”
137
 
 
Combine this with the result of a 2004 survey
138
, which found that “Between them, the justices on the 
Court during the 2003 term registered 2,816 career recusals”, with O’Connor J. having the largest 
number overall with 675, but Breyer J. having the highest rate, with an average of 42 per year
139
, and the 
potential scale of hidden possibly inappropriate recusals emerges.  
 
Thus, inappropriate recusals are problematic both when not caught (whether because appellate review is 
unavailable or not sought), and when caught by an appeal/review process. Remittal to the recusing 
court/judge is problematic, and rehearing before another court/judge is also problematic. So, “hidden” or 
not, inappropriate recusals are undesirable. 
 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
Inappropriate recusals are potentially very damaging - perhaps no less than failures to withdraw when 
required. The difficulties inherent in the resolution of inappropriate recusals demonstrate that the key is 
to avoid them in the first place. Therefore, the emphasis here, as with inappropriate non-recusals, must be 
on prevention. While commentators have rightly engaged with analyses of how to avoid inappropriate 
non-recusals, that kind of effort has been lacking in this area. Judges and parties in the cases discussed 
above would have benefited from clear parameters as to how to balance properly the competing duties of 
the judges. As long as recusal applications fall to be decided by the impugned judges themselves 
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(something entrenched in the common law, which is unlikely to change without external intervention) the 
potential exists to get the balance wrong, meaning that there may always be as much risk of inappropriate 
recusals as there are of inappropriate non-recusals. Even when a strictly objective approach is tightly 
applied, what the “informed observer” might be taken to perceive or apprehend would still be subject to 
interpretation – and disagreement. It may be that the ultimate solution is to take recusal decisions away 
from the impugned judges. However, this is not generally accepted common law jurisprudence. In my 
view, it should be; but that change is not required to address the problems discussed herein, because an 
effective solution can be accommodated within the current law. 
 
It has been said that “an understanding of impartiality cannot be discerned through any overarching 
normative proposition”.
140
 Similarly, providing such a proposition to regulate what is essentially a fact-
driven inquiry can be elusive. However it is possible to provide a framework within a set of principles – 
(a) that adjudicators have a duty to sit and adjudicate on cases allocated to them, displaced only when 
there are objectively justifiable grounds for recusal; (b) that litigants cannot judge-shop and judges 
cannot case-shop; and, (c) that the administration (and image) of justice is served as much by a fearless 
and confident judiciary as by a fair judiciary. It is right that “real” doubts should be resolved in favour of 
recusal. Here, I use the term “real” to mean (by analogy with the apprehensions of the informed observer 
of a “real possibility” of bias) not fanciful, tenuous, fantastic, or superficial.
141
 I would extend the 
analogy and argue that an “over scrupulous, fanciful or fantastic apprehension or a vague worry is not 
sufficient”.
142
 There must be an objectively sound basis for any supposed doubt that the adjudicator 
might entertain, for it cannot be sufficient for an adjudicator merely to state that a real doubt exists 
without setting forth the basis for that doubt. What this means is that, just as the doubts of the informed 
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observer about the judge’s impartiality need to be objectively justified,
143
 an adjudicator’s doubt as to 
whether his or her own impartiality can reasonably be questioned likewise needs to be objectively 
justified. It is instructive that the Court of Appeal in Locabail referred to a “real ground for doubt”.
144
 
This emphasises the ground, rather than the doubt, which makes the inquiry objective, and de-
emphasises the judge’s personal feelings.  
 
On normative propositions, my first would be that recusals ought only to be resorted to for the proper 
purposes - that justice must be done and be seen to be done, “to maintain public confidence in the 
impartiality of judges”, and to “help maintain impartiality as a matter of fact”.
145
 The second would be 
that judge-selection/judge-shopping by litigants ought to be resolutely disallowed, for this is a big enemy 
with the potential to subvert the justice system. Ultimately, the challenge is to “protect the independence 
of those exercising a judicial function, assure confidence in the administration of justice and prevent a 
flood of groundless conspiracy theories.”
146
 It is not clear how one would definitively or even credibly 
test “public confidence” following a recusal decision either way.
147
 But while this remains the primary 
concern of bias and recusal law, we have to proceed with the fiction that we can confidently gauge it. My 
prescription for addressing the threat of inappropriate recusals follows. Judges need to respond to 
allegations of bias with consideration, described as “a particularly careful exercise of the faculty of 
judgement” which must be carried out “with great care and circumspection”.
148
 But they must show some 
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“backbone” in the process – ie, be robust and strictly objective in their application of the applicable 
jurisprudence, which I will now reiterate. The objective inquiry (for the UK at least) focuses on “whether 
the fair-minded and informed observer, having considered the facts, would conclude that there was a real 
possibility that the tribunal was biased”.
149
 Stout describes the “test to be applied by a judge who 
recognises a possible apparent bias issue” as a “double real possibility” test, in that the judge must ask 
“whether or not there is a real possibility that the fair-minded and informed observer might think that 
there was a real possibility of bias”.
150
 Southern African courts have formulated a helpful “double 
reasonableness” test, based on Canadian jurisprudence,
151
 which postulates that “Not only must the 
person apprehending bias be a reasonable person, but the apprehension itself must in the circumstances 
be reasonable”.
152
 A robust application of these standards, which all postulate a high threshold, should 
assist adjudicators to avoid acceding “too readily” to recusal applications. 
 
The notional observer with whose apprehensions the common law is concerned is a paragon of virtue, 
thus described: 
 
“The informed observer is reasonable, right-minded, thoughtful, not necessarily a man nor 
necessarily of European ethnicity or other majority traits, neither complacent nor unduly 
sensitive or suspicious, not unduly compliant or naïve, not entitled to make snap judgments, and 
would not reach a hasty conclusion based on the appearance evoked by an isolated episode of 
temper or remarks to the parties or their representatives, which was taken out of context. He or 
she does not have a very sensitive or scrupulous conscience, can be expected to be aware of the 
                                                          
149
 Lord Hope in Porter v Magill [2001] UKHL 67; [2002] 2 A.C. 357, at [103]. 
150
 H. Stout, “Bias” [2011] 16(4) J.R. 458, at 479. 
151
 De Grandpré J., dissenting, in Committee for Justice and Liberty et al v National Energy Board 
(1976) 68 DLR (3d) 716, at 735 (SC, Canada). 
152
 See SACCAWU, above, fn.5, at [15]; SARFU, above, fn.34, at [45]. Also African Echo (Pty) Ltd v 
Simelane [2014] 3 L.R.C. 583, at [53] (SC, Swaziland); Gaetsaloe v Debswana Diamond Co Pty Ltd (No 
4) [2010] 1 B.L.R. 132, at 133 (CA, Botswana). 
30 
 
legal traditions and culture, but may not be wholly uncritical of this culture, and would adopt a 
balanced approach.”
153
 
 
The apprehensions of bias by this perfectly balanced individual must, in addition to being reasonable, be 
objectively justified.
154
 Adjudicators ought, in their objective analyses and application of the standards to 
the construct, to lay aside their own feelings about the case. It is possible that certain heuristics and the 
cognitive illusions engendered thereby may render the required objectivity herculean
155
; but, so long as 
the common law apportions the recusal decision to the impugned judges, the objectivity quest is 
obligatory. Practically, a possibly fruitful approach to pure objectivity is for judges to envisage that they 
are making a decision in respect of another judge (perhaps as a review/appellate court), but in the context 
of the same factual circumstances. If that purely objective inquiry reveals a sound basis for apprehending 
bias, the judge must withdraw.
156
 Where the objective inquiry does not tilt the scales one way or another 
(ie, there are real grounds for doubt), the judge should withdraw, for, in such cases, it might be preferable 
to err on the side of caution.
157
 Where such an inquiry does not reveal a clear risk of bias, the judge has 
no right to withdraw. As Quirke J. said in DD v Gibbons, a judge is “‘not entitled to accede to [a recusal] 
application unless he was satisfied on the balance of probabilities that an objective and informed person, 
occupying the applicant’s position would reasonably apprehend that the respondent would not bring an 
impartial mind to the adjudication of the case”.
158
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In sum, accedence to an ill-founded claim of bias can be harmful to fairness and due process. The 
relevant policy objectives should prefer neither the party requesting recusal nor the opposing party, each 
of which can be taken to represent a sector of “the public” whose confidence the law seeks to maintain. 
The statements, that “the right to fair procedures does not belong solely to the applicants”, and that “[t]he 
respondents, too, have a right to fair procedures”
159
 merit accentuation. Inappropriate recusals can 
produce mischief, just as inappropriate non-recusals, and can also induce undesirable manipulations or 
subversion of the justice system and of judicial independence.
160
 Stout rightly notes that “[t]he 
consequent loss of court time and costs to the parties are plainly contrary to the public interest, as is the 
fact that one party has effectively had the opportunity, without good cause, to at least partly select its 
tribunal.”
161
 Such ability to judge-select is “contrary to justice”.
162
 Furthermore, adjudicators ought to 
avoid giving “the erroneous impression that it is more important that justice should appear to be done 
than that it should in fact be done.”
163
 Finally, it is essential to heed the exhortations of Kirby P. that 
“Judges should resist being driven from their courts by the conduct or assertion of parties, including 
assertions of actual or imputed bias.”
164
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